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Purpose. Forensic interviewers often face witnesses who are unwilling to cooperate
with the investigation. In this experimental study, we examined the extent to which
cooperativeness instructions affect information disclosure in a witness investigative
interview.
Methods. Onehundred and thirty-six participantswatched a recordedmock-crime and
were interviewed twice as mock-witnesses. They were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions instructing different levels of cooperativeness: Control (no instructions),
Cooperation, No Cooperation, and No Cooperation plus Cooperation. The cooper-
ativeness instructions aimed to influence how participants’ perceived the costs and
benefits of cooperation. We predicted that Cooperation and No Cooperation
instructions would increase and decrease information disclosure and accuracy, respec-
tively.
Results. We found decreased information disclosure and, to a lesser extent, accuracy in
the No Cooperation and No Cooperation plus Cooperation conditions. In a second
interview, the shift of instructions fromNo Cooperation to Cooperation led to a limited
increase of information disclosure at no cost of accuracy. Cooperativeness instructions
partially influenced the communication strategies participants used to disclose or
withhold information.
Conclusions. Our results demonstrate the detrimental effects of uncooperativeness
on information disclosure and, to a lesser extent, the accuracy of witness statements.We
discuss the implications of a lack of witness cooperation and the importance of gaining
witness cooperation to facilitate information disclosure in investigative interviews.
Witnesses can provide crucial information in a criminal investigation, which later can
serve as evidence in court (Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011). In an investigative interview,
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witnesses hold first-hand knowledge not available to the police, and thus by definition,
witnesses are in control of the information and the onus to elicit accurate, detailed, and
complete witness accounts is on the interviewer (Fisher, 1995; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher,
2014). Interviewers consequently rely heavily on witnesses’ cooperation and their
willingness to disclose information. However, somewitnesses do notwant to get involved
in criminal investigations and are unwilling to divulge information to the police (Spencer
& Stern, 2001), which can be detrimental to effective crime management (Tyler & Fagan,
2008). Despite its relevance, the effects of lack of witness cooperation on information
disclosure within investigative interviews have received little scientific scrutiny. In this
experimental study, we examined the extent to which cooperativeness instructions
affected information disclosure and accuracy of witness statements.
Uncooperative witnesses in investigative interviews
Police officers report frequently encountering witnesses who are unwilling to become
involved in the investigative process (Confrey, 2017; De La Fuente Vilar, Horselenberg, &
Van Koppen, 2018; Wheeler, Gabbert, Clayman, & Jones, 2017). Some witnesses are
reluctant to talk, resistant to engage in the investigation, and can be hostile towards the
police (Shepherd&Griffiths, 2013).Witnesseswhohave been intimidated are also averse
to cooperate with the police (Maynard, 1994). Beyond these labels and legal categories,
witnesses’ lack of motivation to cooperate with police is what characterizes uncooper-
ativewitnesses. Their cooperativeness (or lack thereof) is reflected in their behaviour as
witnesses, which in the context of an investigative interview, is their willingness to
disclose detailed and accurate information.
Lack ofwitness cooperation can bemotivated by fear of retribution from the suspect, a
relationshipwith the suspect, a criminal history or risk of self-incrimination, distrust of the
police or the criminal justice system, type and severity of the crime, cultural differences,
language barriers, witness apathy, or the inconvenience of legal proceedings (Confrey,
2017; Papp, Smith, Wareham, &Wu, 2017; Shepherd & Griffiths, 2013; Spencer & Stern,
2001; Westera & Powell, 2015).
Witness cooperation and information disclosure in investigative interviews
Individuals regulate their behaviour based on a subjective evaluation of benefits and costs
(Homans, 1958). As in other social interactions and interpersonal relationships, civilian
cooperation with the police is regulated by moral ideas about society and by any
associated consequences and risks (Papp et al., 2017). A behavioural economics approach
involving cost–benefit analysis has beenproposed to account for decisions to report crime
bywitnesses (Kidd, 1979) and victims (Bowles et al., 2009; Goudriaan, 2006); as well as to
explain information disclosure in interrogations by suspects (Yang, Guyll, & Madon,
2017) and informants (Neequaye & Luke, 2018).
We propose to extend the cost–benefit analysis model for reporting crime by
witnesses (Kidd, 1979), to the analysis of witnesses’ decision to disclose information in
investigative interviews. We argue that interview outcomes depend on the internal
motivation of thewitness to engage and cooperatewith the interviewer,which ultimately
determine the quality of witness statements. Consequently, the decision of a witness to
disclose information is motivated by the perceived high benefits (and the low costs)
associated with cooperating with the interviewer. Conversely, a subjective evaluation of
high costs with no perceived benefits can lead to the decision of a witness to not
cooperate with the interviewer, thus negatively affecting information disclosure.
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A commonly held expectation is that an individual who becomes a witness to a crime
will cooperate with the police (Fyfe & Smith, 2007; Roberts, 2010). Given the demands of
an investigative interview, interviewers expect disclosure of truthful and relevant
information as is required and delivered in an efficient manner (Antaki & Stokoe, 2017).
Nonetheless, police officers report that witnesses rarely provide sufficient information
during investigative interviews (Kebbell &Milne, 1998). Lack of disclosure of information
is often associated with memory limitations. However, due to social and motivational
rather than cognitive factors, some interviewees who can remember are unwilling to
report what they recall (Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Str€omwall, & Kleinman, 2015; Shepherd,
1993; Westera & Powell, 2015).
Individuals strategically control whether to report or omit pieces of information based
on personal and situational goals (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). This monitoring process
determines the quantity, accuracy, and level of detail of the information disclosed. As a
result, in the context of reporting to aid a criminal investigation, there are indications that
individuals focus on maximizing accurate and forensically relevant information (Brewer,
Vagadia, Hope, & Gabbert, 2018). Findings from eyewitness research indicate that
cooperative witnesses in general are highly accurate and provide detailed albeit
incomplete statements (e.g., Hope, Gabbert, & Fraser, 2013; Smeets, Candel, &
Merckelbach, 2004).
The extent to which lack of witness cooperation regulates information disclosure has
not previously been examined. However, similar research in human intelligence
gathering demonstrated that uncooperative sources resist cooperating and avoid
disclosing information by strategically omitting new or critical information and engage
in providing succinct, fabricated, scripted, unrelated, or no answers when being
interviewed (Alison et al., 2014). Moreover, in order to appear cooperative, some
interviewees aim to strike a balance of disclosing not too much nor too little information
(Granhag et al., 2015).
Based on previous research, regulating information disclosure in the context of a
witness interview is likely to affect the memory for the event. Researchers have shown
that whether withholding information is accompanied, or not, by remembering
determines memory preservation or forgetting (Stone, Coman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst,
2012).Ononehand, unreported informationmaybe forgotten due to lack of rehearsal. On
the other hand, mental rehearsal facilitates remembering, even when information is not
disclosed in conversation (Smith, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2013) and suppression efforts
can be unsuccessful when purposefully trying to not remember an event (Anderson &
Green 2001). Memory, therefore, is not necessarily impaired as a result of lack of
disclosure (Stone et al., 2012). However, findings from experimental research examining
the consequences of feigning crime amnesia showed that withholding information
produces amemory-undermining effect and genuinely reporting it later comes at a cost for
accuracy (Christianson & Bylin, 1999; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004, 2006). More
recent research on this topic suggests that the undermining memory effects of
withholding information are not long-lasting andmight be an artefact of testing (Mangiulli,
Van Oorsouw, Curci, Merckelbach, & Jelicic, 2018; Sun, Punjabi, Greenberg, & Seamon,
2009). Another likely explanation for these positive effects in memory is the lack of
purposeful avoidance and suppression efforts when withholding information (Otgaar &
Baker, 2018). While the mnemonic effects of witnesses withholding crime information
have not been examined previously, it couldmean that if uncooperativewitnesses are not
motivated to forget the event their memory of it might be preserved despite lack of
disclosure. This expected memory preservation effect could be due to the self-rehearsal
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practice involved in remembering the event even in the absence of reporting which
enhances memory recollection (Mangiulli, Lanciano, van Oorsouw, Jelicic, & Curci,
2019).
The present research
The effects of lack of witness cooperation on the elicited information in an investigative
interview have not been empirically tested. To address that shortcoming, we examined
the extent to which the witnesses’ cooperativeness affects information disclosure and
accuracy of witness statements in investigative interviews. Participants were interviewed
after watching a recorded mock-crime. We expected a cost–benefit analysis to guide the
witness’ decision to cooperate (Kidd, 1979) and subsequently disclose information. We
manipulated the perception of benefits and costs associated with cooperating with the
interviewer. Specifically, we increased the perceived cost of cooperation by placing
participants at risk of self-incrimination; inversely, we increased the perceived benefits of
cooperating by emphasizing civil duty of serving as a key witness in the investigation
(Spencer & Stern, 2001). In addition, participants received instructions designed to
encourage cooperativeness or lack of cooperativeness, but independently decided on the
extent of their disclosure thus allowing us to examinewhether cooperativeness regulates
information disclosure.
We hypothesized that cooperativeness instructions would affect information
disclosure (measured in number of details) and accuracy. Specifically:
Hypothesis 1. We expected the instructions to cooperate to increase both information
disclosure (hypothesis 1a) and accuracy (hypothesis 1b) in the Cooperation
condition, and the instructions to not cooperate to decrease them in the No
Cooperation and No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition in contrast
with the Control condition, in the first interview.
Hypothesis 2. We predicted that the instructions to cooperate would increase both
information disclosure (hypothesis 2a) and accuracy (hypothesis 2b) in the
Cooperation condition, and the instructions to not cooperate to decrease
them in the No Cooperation condition in contrast with the Control
condition, in the second interview. Moreover, for the No Cooperation plus
Cooperation condition we expected that a new instruction to cooperate,
after initial instructions to not cooperate in the first interview, would
effectively reframe the costs and benefits associated with cooperating
consequently increasing information disclosure in the second interview.
Hypothesis 3. We hypothesized that the new instruction to cooperate would increase
disclosure for theNoCooperation plus Cooperation condition in the second
interview versus first interview. Considering the different findings regarding
themnemonic effects ofwithholding information (cf. Stone et al., 2012), we
did not provide directional hypotheses for the effects of delayed disclosure
on the accuracy of previously withheld information.
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Hypothesis 4. We also hypothesized that participants would regulate and strategically
control information disclosure to avoid cooperating with the interviewer’s
requests of information. Therefore, we predicted that participants would
use different communication strategies to disclose or withhold information
according to the instructions to cooperate and not cooperate in the
simulated interviews.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and forty university students initially participated in the study. They earned
either one research credit or a €10 gift card as compensation for their participation. Four
cases were excluded (1 participant did not attend the second interview, while the
remaining 3 participants were excluded due to technological problems during the
interviews). Participants (N = 136, 78.7% female; 18–57 years of age; M = 23.17 years,
SD = 6.96) were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions instructing their
cooperativeness: Control (no instructions), Cooperation, No Cooperation, and No
CooperationplusCooperation (with 34participants in each group), in a between-subjects
design with cooperativeness instructions as independent variable and information
disclosure (total amount of details) and accuracy as the main dependent variables. This
research received approval by the university’s ethical committee.
Materials
Stimulus event
Participants watched a recorded mock-crime (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). The
recording lasts 6 min and 30 s, and depicts a home burglary. A man enters a house and
performs different electrical work while stealing some objects from the household.
Post-interview questionnaires
Participants self-reported whether they complied with the experimental instructions and
how much complete information they estimated they disclosed in the interview.
Participants provided ratings on a 5-point scale, with values ranging from ‘Not at all’ to
‘Extremely’, where higher scores indicated higher compliance and higher information
disclosure, respectively. Lastly, participants reported the communication strategies they
used to disclose information. They provided ratings on a 5-point scale with values ranging
from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’, where higher scores indicated higher frequency of use (see
Table 3 for the listed strategies and descriptive statistics).
Procedure
Interview 1
Prior to watching the stimulus video, participants were asked to pay attention to the
footage of a burglary, as they would be asked to provide a statement as an eyewitness to
the crime later. During a 10-minute delay interval, participants completed a demographic
questionnaire and performed an unrelated distraction task. Then, participantswere asked
to imagine being at a police station for an investigative interview about what they had
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seen. They received the cooperativeness instructions according to their experimental
condition (see Appendix S1). As an incentive, participants were warned that failure to
follow the instructions would disqualify them from receiving their compensation for
participation.
Participants who were in the Cooperation condition were asked to act as the key and
only witness in the investigation and instructed to cooperate with the police. They were
reminded of the importance of their testimony to advance the investigation. In the No
Cooperation andNoCooperation plus Cooperation (Interview 1) conditions, participants
received instructions to not cooperate, andwere explicitly told theywere innocent of any
crime but that the police was considering their involvement in the burglary. Participants
were instructed to not cooperate with the police, but were not directed on how not to
cooperate. As incentive to comply with the instructions to not cooperate, participants
received a warning that their statement might incriminate them as they were present at
the time of the crime and knew the suspect. In the Control condition, participants were
instructed that they were independent witnesses who did not know the victim or the
suspect, and they did not receive any instructions regarding cooperation.
All participants provided a verbal free recall account of the event, after which they
were prompted once to provide any extra information. All interviews followed the same
interviewing script that included evidence-based interviewing guidelines for witness
interviews (e.g., rapport-building, mental context reinstatement, instructions to report
everything in detail and to avoid guessing; Fisher et al., 2011).
Interview 2
All participants returned to the laboratory a week later, and they all received the same
instructions for the second interview, except for the participants in the No Cooperation
plus Cooperation condition. Participants in that condition were informed that the police
no longer had the suspicion they had committed the crime and therefore they were not at
risk of being incriminated. They were instructed to act as independent witnesses and to
cooperate in this second interview, and they were reminded of the importance of their
new statement to advance the investigation. However, they were not asked to act as the
key witness in the investigation, which was the role prescribed for participants in the
Cooperation condition in both interviews.
Coding
Participants gave consent to be audio-recorded in both interviews, and verbatim
transcripts were used for coding. We coded details as correct if they were reported as
presented in the recorded mock-crime or as incorrect if they were in error or not present
in the recording. The total amount of details was tallied for each interview as ameasure of
information disclosure. An index of accuracy was calculated for each interview by
dividing the number of correctly recalled details by the total number of details (e.g., the
sum of the number of correctly reported details plus the number of incorrect details).
Inter-rater reliability
A random sample of 25% interviews were coded by a research assistant blind to the
experimental conditions. The level of inter-rater agreementwas high, ICC = 0.96, 95% CI
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[0.87, 0.99] and ICC = 0.95, 95% CI [0.85, 0.98] for correct and incorrect details,
respectively.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Participants reported themselves to be compliant with the experimental instructions
(M = 4.64, SD = 0.50). A one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
showed that participants’ self-reported compliancewith the experimental instructions to
regulate their cooperativeness did not vary between the experimental conditions, F(3,
132) = 1.20, p = .311,x2 = .005. This means participants reported to have followed the
instructions to cooperate and to not cooperate. Participants also reported how much
complete information they believed they disclosed in the interviews, F(3, 132) = 3.03,
p = .032, x2 = .043; Control M = 3.82, SD = 0.94 versus Cooperation M = 4.09,
SD = 0.71 versus No Cooperation M = 3.53, SD = 0.79 versus No Cooperation/Cooper-
ation M = 3.82, SD = .58. Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed
that the participants that received No Cooperation instructions indicated disclosing less
information compared to those that received Cooperation instructions, t(132) = 3.02,
p = .018, d = .74, 95% CI [1.24, 0.26]. All other pairwise comparisons were not
statistically different (all ps > .05). These findings show that participants to some extent
disclosed information according to the instructions to cooperate and not cooperate.
Hypotheses testing
Interview 1. Does cooperativeness affect information disclosure?
We conducted a one-way between-subjects ANOVA that revealed a significant effect of
cooperativeness instructions on information disclosure in the first interview, F(3,
132) = 13.43, p < .001, x2 = .215 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and outcomes of
condition comparisons). Follow-up post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections
showed that information disclosure in the Control conditionwas significantly higher than
in the No Cooperation condition, t(132) = 4.70, p < .001, d = 1.06, 95% CI [1.58,
0.56]; and the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition, t(132) = 5.53, p < .001,
d = 1.33, 95% CI [1.85, 0.80]. Similarly, information disclosure was significantly
higher in the Cooperation condition compared to the No Cooperation condition, t
(132) = 3.07, p = .016, d = .75, 95% CI [1.24, 0.26]; and the No Cooperation plus
Cooperation condition, t(132) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 1.02, 95% CI [1.53,0.52]. The
difference between the Control and the Cooperation conditions was not significant, t
(132) = 1.64, p = .627, d = .37, 95% CI [0.84, 0.11], and neither was the comparison
between the two No Cooperation conditions, t(132) = 0.82, p = 1.00, d = .22, 95% CI
[0.70, 0.26]. These results provide partial support to hypothesis 1a, indicating that
during the first interview, participants from theNoCooperation andNoCooperation plus
Cooperation conditions disclosed significantly less information than those in the Control
condition. However, participants in the Cooperation condition did not disclose
significantlymore information than those in theControl condition. Informationdisclosure
by participants in the Control conditionwas higher than in theCooperative condition, but
not statistically different.
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Does cooperativeness affect accuracy in Interview 1?
We conducted a one-way between-subjects ANOVA of cooperativeness instructions on
accuracy of the information disclosed during the first interview. The Levene’s test
indicated inequality of variance (p < .001); therefore, we report the Welch F-ratio. There
was a significant effect of cooperativeness instructions on the overall accuracy of the
information disclosed, F(3, 131) = 3.93, p = .012, x2 = .05. Follow-up Games–Howell
post-hoc comparisons showed that accuracy means were high and similar across the
conditions (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and outcomes of condition comparisons),
except for significantly higher accuracy rates in theControl condition compared to theNo
Cooperation plus Cooperation condition, t(131) = 2.71, p = .046, d = .62, 95% CI
[1.11, 0.13]. Overall accuracy rates were high across conditions. However, partici-
pants in the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition disclosed less accurate
information (76%) than those in theControl condition (85%). Providing partial support for
hypothesis 1b, we found that cooperativeness instructions regulated to a small extent the
proportion of accurate information disclosed during the first interview. Specifically,
participants in the No Cooperation plus Cooperation disclosed significantly less accurate
information, but participants in the Cooperation condition did not providemore accurate
information.
Does increased cooperativeness affect delayed disclosure in Interview 2?
We conducted a between-subjects ANOVA of cooperativeness instructions on informa-
tion disclosure during the second interview (see Figure 1 for the effect of cooperativeness
instructions on information disclosure in both interviews).We found a significant effect of
cooperativeness instructions on the information disclosed in the second interview, F(3,
132) = 8.01, p < .001, x2 = .134 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and outcomes of
condition comparisons). Follow-up post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections
showed that information disclosure in the Control conditionwas significantly higher than
the No Cooperation condition, t(132) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 1.04, 95% CI [1.54,0.53]
and the No Cooperation plus Cooperation, t(132) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.92, 95% CI
[1.42,0.42]. All other pairwise comparisons were not significant (p > .05). Providing
only partial support for hypothesis 2, we found that No Cooperation instructions
decreased disclosure, whereas Cooperation instructions did not lead to higher rates of
disclosure compared to the Control condition. Furthermore, those that received a new
Cooperation instruction in the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition did not
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for information disclosure and accuracy in interview 1 by
condition
Information disclosure Accuracy rate
M SD M SD
Control 112.15a 46.51 0.85a 0.08
Cooperation 96.26a 40.34 0.82a,b 1.00
No Cooperation 66.44b 39.07 0.79a,b 0.19
No Cooperation plus Cooperation 58.47b 33.19 0.76b 0.19
Note. Means sharing a common subscript are not statistically different at p < .05 according to post-hoc
comparisons.
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disclose as much information as those participants in the Control condition during the
second interview.
We conducted a paired-sample t-test on the total amount of information disclosed for
the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition across each of the interviews and found
that disclosure significantly increased from the first (M = 58.47, SD = 33.19) to the
second interview (M = 77.59, SD = 38.74); t(33) = 2.51, p = .017, d = .53, 95% CI
[0.05, 1.01]. Providing support for hypothesis 3, the No Cooperation plus Cooperation
instruction to shift from uncooperativeness to cooperativeness in the second interview
significantly increased the total amount of information disclosed for that condition.
Nonetheless, the previous finding indicated that the new cooperativeness instruction did
not elicit overall comparable delayed disclosure. Together, these findings indicate that
instructing cooperativeness after initial uncooperativeness can increase information
disclosure only to some extent.
Does cooperativeness affect communication strategies to disclose information?
Self-report ratings were used to explore the extent to which communication strategies to
disclose or withhold information are a function of cooperativeness instructions. To test
hypothesis 4, ANOVAswere carried out for each communication strategy and followedup
with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons. For parsimony, only significant effects
are reported in this section (see Table 3 for complete descriptive and inferential statistics
and Appendix S1 for non-significant effects). When the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was violated, correctedWelch F-ratios were computed and Games–Howell post-
hoc comparisons calculated. We found that instructed cooperativeness affected
participants’ willingness to provide accurate information, Welch F(3, 132) = 4.77,
p = .004, x2 = .089. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the No
Cooperation condition indicated including less accurate information in their statements
compared to those in the Control condition, t(132) = 3.09, p = .017, d = .75, 95% CI
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Control Cooperation No Cooperation No Cooperation plus
Cooperation
sliated etarucca fo snae
M
Interview 1
Inteview 2
Figure 1. Mean number of disclosed details as a function of cooperativeness instructions (Control vs.
Cooperation vs. No Cooperation vs. No Cooperation plus Cooperation). Error bars represent  1.96
standard errors (95% confidence intervals)
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[0.26, 1.24], and the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition, t(132) = 3.03,
p = .018, d = .73, 95% CI [0.24, 1.23]. Furthermore, participants reported they included
both accurate and inaccurate information in their statements according to cooperative-
ness instructions, F(3, 132) = 4.67, p = .004, x2 = .075. In particular, post-hoc compar-
isons revealed that participants in the No Cooperation condition more frequently used
this communication strategy compared to participants in the Control condition, t
(132) = 3.00, p = .020, d = .70, 95% CI [1.19,0.21]; the Cooperation condition, t
(132) = 3.30, p = .008, d = .77, 95% CI [1.26,0.28]; and theNo Cooperation plus
Cooperation condition, t(132) = 2.80, p = .036, d = .62, 95% CI [1.10, 0.13]. In
addition, therewas a significant effect of cooperativeness instructions onparticipants that
frequently did not provide a response, Welch F(3, 132) = 3.96, p = .012, x2 = .030.
However, post-hoc comparisons revealed no significant comparisons across conditions.
In partial support for hypothesis 4, taken together, these findings indicate that the
communication strategies used to disclose and withhold information are different when
participants receive Cooperation or No Cooperation instructions. Specifically, partici-
pantswho receivedNoCooperation instructions in both interviewsweremore frequently
inclined to disclose less accurate information andmore inclined to disclose a combination
of accurate and inaccurate information in their statements.
Discussion
We found partial support for the effect of witness cooperativeness on information
disclosure during simulated police interviews. In particular, participants who received
instructions to not cooperate in both No Cooperation conditions disclosed less
information than participants in the Cooperation and Control conditions. Furthermore,
we found that cooperativeness instructions only moderately affected the proportion of
accurate information disclosed. While most participants disclosed accurate information,
participants in the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition disclosed the least
accurate information (76–74% vs. 83–85% Control, in each of the interviews). Contrary to
our prediction, instructions to cooperate did not increase disclosure and accuracy across
the interviews. Overall, the uncooperativeness instructions negatively affected informa-
tion disclosure, and accuracy to a lesser extent. Our findings demonstrate that
unwillingness to cooperate can regulate the quantity and quality of the information
disclosed when serving as a witness in an investigative interview, in line with previous
research on civilian cooperation and crime reporting (Kidd, 1979). Furthermore, our
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for information disclosure and accuracy in interview 2 by
condition
Information disclosure Accuracy rate
M SD M SD
Control 118.12a 49.09 0.83a 0.10
Cooperation 98.79a,b 45.65 0.80a 0.09
No Cooperation 72.44b 38.32 0.74a 0.21
No Cooperation plus Cooperation 77.59b 38.74 0.74a 0.30
Note. Means sharing a common subscript are not statistically different at p < .05 according to post-hoc
comparisons.
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findings provide empirical support for the previously proposed detrimental effect of lack
of cooperation on information disclosure in investigative interviews (Shepherd &
Griffiths, 2013; Spencer & Stern, 2001; Westera & Powell, 2015). This finding highlights
the importance of interviewers gainingwitness cooperation as lack thereof can negatively
affect the outcome of the interview (Vrij et al., 2014).
Our prediction for increased disclosure and accuracy for participants in the
Cooperation condition was not supported. It is conceivable this is because participants
in the Control condition (no instructions) were forthcoming and disclosed detailed and
accurate information by default. This effect could have been enhanced by the type of
crime used in this experiment, as burglary is often associated with higher reporting rates
(Van Dijk, Van Kesteren, & Smit, 2007). It is also possible that being requested to act as a
key witness and to cooperate with the police in the simulated interview failed to instil a
perceived high benefit for disclosing information given the low stakes of the experimental
situation and the decline in societal responsibility regarding civic participation (Spencer&
Stern, 2001), thereby explaining why the rates of disclosure were not significantly
different in the Cooperation to the Control condition. However, if the manipulation was
effective, participants in the Cooperation condition could have inadvertently perceived
that acting as a key witness was associated with increased benefits of withholding (rather
than disclosing) information given the weight of their account for the investigation.
Individuals tend to strategically control disclosure by meta-cognitively assessing how
informative and accurate each piece of information is in order to decidewhether to report
or omit information (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Given the demands and goals of the
current experimental condition, potentially there is an internal request for higher
accuracy, at the cost of overall disclosure (Brewer et al., 2018). This latter interpretation of
our finding requires further empirical testing, and it is directly relevant for interviewers as
it warns them about potential undue responsibility raised by specific instructions that
could affect witness accounts.
We also tested the effects of a new instruction to cooperate on delayed disclosure.
Participants in the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition disclosed more
information when they were instructed to shift to cooperativeness in the second
interview after initial uncooperativeness. However, the instructions to cooperate did not
effectively increase disclosure for the No Cooperation plus Cooperation condition
compared with the Cooperation and Control conditions. This means that increased
cooperativeness can increase information disclosure to a limited extent. Therefore, across
interviews, increased cooperativeness led to partial information gain compared with
securing cooperativeness from the start. Similarly, research on human intelligence
gathering indicates that initial cooperation is a predictor of subsequent cooperative
behaviour (Christiansen et al., 2018). Conversely, it could explain that some resistance
lingered into the second interview as a result of the experimental suspicion of
incrimination instilled in the first interview, which is not conducive to cooperation.
Considering a continuum between resistance and cooperation (Kelly, Miller, & Redlich,
2016), this finding indicates amovement towards cooperation given the newCooperation
instruction rather than a complete reversal of the No Cooperation instruction. In
operational settings, even a partial shift is a positive investigative outcome in light of the
challenging long-lasting effects of uncooperativeness (Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib, &
Christiansen, 2013).
Our complementary analysis showed a significant (albeit small) increase of informa-
tion disclosure in the second interview across conditions, which could be a result of the
memory protective effect of repeated recall attempts (Roediger & Butler, 2011).
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Moreover, the moderate increased disclosure came at no significant cost for accuracy.
This is crucial when evaluating information reported by uncooperative witnesses who
later come forward with information. Thus, we caution the interpretation of this result
considering the mixed evidence examining the effects of lack of disclosure in other
contexts (cf. Mangiulli et al., 2018; Stone et al., 2012). Further examinations should
replicate this finding to test specifically whether cooperativeness affects witnessmemory
and delayed disclosure by witnesses. Specifically, we suggest to examine the effects of
different strategies used for not reporting (e.g., fabrication vs. omission). Nonetheless, as
increasing cooperativeness can facilitate disclosure of previously withheld information,
interviewers should aim (and be encouraged) to gain witness cooperation to gather more
complete and detailed witness statements.
Lastly, as expected, we found that participants reported engaging in different patterns
of communication to strategically disclose accurate information according to their
instructed cooperativeness. Participants instructed to not cooperate were less willing to
disclose accurate information and more willing to disclose a combination of accurate and
inaccurate information. Similar counter-interrogation strategies have been reported to be
used to avoid cooperation in intelligence interviews (Alison et al., 2014). Moreover, these
patterns of disclosure are different from the interviewer’s expectations of witness
cooperation in investigative interviews (Antaki & Stokoe, 2017; Fyfe & Smith, 2007;
Kebbell & Milne, 1998). This finding is particularly interesting to understand witness
cooperation in relation to the interviewer’s goal of gathering information. Therefore,
future research can examine whether interviewers are affected by the communication
strategies used by uncooperative witnesses, and whether investigative interviews are
conducted adjusting to the witness cooperativeness.
Limitations and future research
Our findings should be considered within the limitations of this experimental method-
ology. We used a mock-crime witness paradigm followed by simulated police interviews
with a university student sample, which limits the ecological validity of our findings.
Acting as a witness in a real crime investigation involves higher stakes, which are
associated with competing motivations to cooperate with the police. Therefore, future
research should examine how intrinsic cooperation and lack thereof affect information
disclosure in a more realistic scenario, in order to replicate the effects of instructed
cooperativeness addressed by this research, and be able to better generalize the results to
real investigative interviewing practice. Furthermore, we encourage future replications,
using larger samples (Lakens & Evers, 2014), to confirm the reliability of our findings.
The experimental scenario we designed enabled us to examine whether information
disclosure varied in relation to instructed cooperativeness. Participantswere instructed to
cooperate and to not cooperate, and they independently regulated information
disclosure. We argued that participants would engage in an analysis of costs and benefits
regarding cooperatingwith the interviewer (e.g., Kidd, 1979), and thus considerwhether
to disclose or withhold information. While our findings support the effect of uncoop-
erativeness on information disclosure, we cannot unequivocally adjudicate a cost–benefit
analysis as the underlyingmechanism guiding disclosure behaviour inwitness interviews.
For that reason, future research ought to explicitly test whether this model can in fact
explain the willingness to disclose information according to witness cooperativeness. In
addition, moving beyond the effect of instructed cooperativeness on the amount or
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accuracy of the information disclosed, research could examine the type of information
provided (e.g., central vs. peripheral details).
In our research, the cooperativeness instructions were coupledwith a designated role
aimed at influencing cooperativeness. Participants in the Cooperation condition received
instructions to cooperate in combinationwith a request to act as key and onlywitnesses in
the investigation, whereas participants who received No Cooperation instructions were
asked to not cooperate as they risked self-incrimination. While this design allowed us to
provide novel insight on the effects of cooperativeness on information disclosure, the
individual contributions of each of these factors that regulate cooperation remain to be
examined. For instance, further research on the effects of personal responsibility when
being the sole versus one of a number ofwitnesses on information disclosure iswarranted
(Kidd, 1979). Second, we cannot rule out that participants in the No Cooperation
condition may have considered their relationship to the suspect (i.e., a fictitious
colleague) when providing their statements. Thus, future research should explicitly test
the relationship to the perpetrator (and the victim) as these factors have been found to
affect witness cooperation (cf. Spencer & Stern, 2001). Additionally, given that we only
examined cooperativeness after being a mock-witness to a burglary, future research is
needed to evaluate whether the observed effects on information disclosure in mock-
interviews extend to other types of crime, especially considering that type and severity of
the crime influencewillingness to report crime andbecomeawitness (Fyfe&Smith, 2007;
Nicksa, 2014).
Conclusion
Our findings provide empirical evidence that witness cooperation partially affects
information disclosure in an investigative interview. Specifically, lack of cooperation is
detrimental to information gathering as it decreases information disclosure and seems to
only moderately decrease accuracy. Moreover, gaining cooperation after initial lack of
cooperation can moderately increase information disclosure at no significant cost of
accuracy in a delayed disclosure. These results are in line with individual’s self-reports of
disclosing less accurate information, or a combination of accurate and inaccurate
information to strategically control disclosure when trying to not cooperate in the
interviews. In light of the current findings, it is imperative that practitioners aim to gain
witness cooperation from the outset, as this best facilitates disclosure of information and,
accordingly, higher quality witness statements.
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